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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
THIRTEENTH AND WASHINGTON
STREETS CORPORATION, a California
·
Corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellamt,
-· vs.CLARENCE C. NESLEN, ELLIOTT W.
E\TANS, H. D. LOWRY, and MARVIN J.
BERTOCH,

Case No.
7875

Defend(}Jyt.ts and Respondoots.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an action for rent to which Defendants answered with the affirmative defense, inter alia, of constructive eviction. It is on ap·peal from a judgment ren- .
dered by the District Court of the Third Judicial District
against Appellant-Plaintiffs for no cause of action, and
from a denial by the Court of Appellant's motion to
amend the judgment, Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law. The lower Court held that the manner of operation· and maintenance of the building in question constituted an eviction of Defendants and· le-gally justified
abandonment and subsequent non-payment of rent.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Appellant is a California corporation. On March
27, 1948, App·ellant and respondents, a law firm, entered
into a written five-year lease (Exhibit "A") for certain
rooms in 'the third floor of the Darling Building, located
at the corner of Main Street and Third South, Salt Lake
City, Utah. The lease was for five years cormnencing
on May 1, 1948 and ending on April 30, 1953. Rent was
Three Hundred Ten Dollars ($310.00) per month, payable in advance.
The Darling Building. is one of Salt Lake City's
older downtown buildings. It was originally built to
be used as a department sto~e, and the first floor and
mezzanine are still used as such. It is almost square in
shape with no center light well, high "loft type" ceilings,
large windows, and is five (5) stories high. (R. page
84).
The upper floors have not been used for several
years~ In 1948, the owners of this building had decided
to convert them into office space. Their plan, which was
subsequently followed, was to convert one floor at a time
to such use, commencing with th~ third floor.
Mr. Kipp, Plaintiff's agent and building Manager,
stated that it was his and the owner's intention·to maintain and operate the building as first-class office building, at least to the extent the physical structure permitted, and that he intended to le~ase space to first..:class
tenants ( R. page 84).
Respondents examined the building before signing
the lease, checking the entrance, elevators, stairs and
restrooms. Plaintiff agreed to arrange respondents'
2
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spare according to their desires, and did so. Partiti~ns
"~ere constructed in their suite dividing it into six (6)
separate offices, a reception room, and a separate law
library. The roo1ns 'vere lighted accordingly. The total
area of space let '\vas approximately 1700 square feet at
the rent agreed to be paid, which was about Two Dollars
($2.00) per square foot per year. (R. page 79; Exhibit
··B").
Respondents were the first tenants above the departInent store and went into occupancy in May, 1948. At
that time, ..._~ppellants had not completed remodeling of
the floor which respondents occupied. Mr. Kipp, who ·
had long experience in the field of building management
(R. page 83), testified that the upper floors could have
been more easily rented if they had been blocked into
smaller rooms, but th_at this was avoided because it would
attract undesirable tenants. (R. page 90). The office
space was gradually filled, and in January of 1950 numbered such tenants as the Utah Foundation, the Hart- ·
ford- Accident and Indemnity Company, the Commercial
Credit Corporation, a Retail Credit Company branch, a
dentist, a Christian Science reading room, the Utah
Dental Supply Company, and the office of the Chinchilla -Breeders Association of America. (R. page 85).
These tenancies were augmented at the time of trial by
the Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company,
Bausch and Lomb Optical Company, and S. H. Claussin
Company, watch distributors. (R. page 86).
Appellant leased space adjacent to the building entranceway on the first floor to a barber shop. Persons

3
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entering the building proceeded up a short stairway
facing the barber shop, and then turned to the right to
the elevators. This led to some confusion (R. page 37),
and Appellant therefore constructed a partition between
the hallway and the barber shop, and posted signs indicating the direction to the elevators. (R. page 45). Subsequent to respondents' abandonment, Appellant constructed a new entrance leading from the street directly
to the elevators, which was completely separated from
the barber shop and beauty salon.
Shortly before the installation of the partition, Appellants received a letter from Defendant N eslen pointing out the desirability of moving a beauty parlor, which
he represented, from its location on the mezzanine of the
building to a new place behind the barber shop. This
was subsequently done. This new ·location had no effect
on access. to the elevators. Although the hair dryers
from the beauty salon occasionally partially obstructed
the back hall leading to the · firetower · stairs, this hall
was only used when the elevators were ·not operating.
The elevators op,erated ~til after 8 :00 o'clock, by which
time the beauty salon was closed (R. page 46), and a
semi-rigid curtain (Exhibit 2) was pulled across the
space between the beauty salon and the·hall. (R. page 46).
At times during the winters of 1948-49 and 1949-50,
the building was inadequately heated, and overclothing
had to be worn. Subsequent to the winte~ of 1948-49, ·
a new thermostatic control· was placed throughout the
building (R. page 36), and after a few adjustments, Mr.
Kipp testified that it worked satisfactorily, and has been
so working ever since.
4
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The rest roo1ns were at times dirty and odoriferous,
although the janitorial force had been increased during
the course of respondents' tenancy to facilitate cleaning
and building n1aintenance. (R. page 105).
Elevator service co1n1nenced at about 8 :00 A.M. and
stoppe~ at about 8:30 P.M. The doors to the building
'vere locked by the watchman at about 8:00 P.M. and on
holidays and Sundays. Respondents had keys, but their
clients, of course, did not, and clients visiting respondents after about 8 :00 P.M. or on Sundays or holidays
would have to be admitted.
The lease provided with regard to these matters:
HEleventh-the lessors shall be further the
sole judge as to the amount of and time when
heat and light shall be supplied to s.aid premises,
and shall be the sole judge of the janitor and elevator service to be supplied."
With regard to heat, the lease further provided:

•

"Heat will be provided from the apparatus for·
heating the building from 8 :00 A.M. until 9 :00
P.M. (Sundays and legal holidays excepted) whenever such heat shall, in the owners' judgment, be
required for the comfortable occupation of said
··premises. Temporary failure to furnish heat shall
not, however, be construed .as an eviction of the
tenant and shall give tenants no claim for damages a~ainst owners, and shall not ju~tify tenants
in failing to observe and perform any of the obligations under his tenancy ... " RUles wn.d Regulations No. 14.
Access to the third floor was. gained either by elevator, when operating, or when available on the main
5
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floor for self operation, or by the stairwell. The stairwells were given particularly keen surveillance by the
Fire Marshal because of. the upward reclassification
of the building, and the Marsh8l's only complaints referred to obstruction of the back corridor by the beauty
salon operators. ( R. ·page 103). The building manager
stated that instant action was always taken against the
salon ope.rators whenever such matters came to his attention, and a threat to cancel their lease was made. (R.
page 101).
Respondents made an inquiry at the Newhouse Building (R. page 74) for substitute space; and inquired frequently at the Continental Bank Building. Inquiries
at the latter building were unsuccessful until the Spring ·
of 1950 (R. page 74) when space became available there.
An attempt was made to rescind the lease on a voluntary basis (R. page 74) so that respondents could mo:ve
to the Continental Bank Building. When Appellants
would not agree, respondents wrote a lette.r dated May
13, 1950 (Exhibit 5) in which they stated some, but not
all, of the grievances brought out in testimony, and requested release from the lease without litigation.
This request was refused by Appellant, and respondents thereupon abandoned the premises on June 30, 1950.
Despite due diligence, Appellants were unable to relet the
premises until March 1, 1951.
The District Court concluded that these acts and
omissions of Ap·pellant and of other tenants constituted
an eviction which justified respondents in vacating the
premises and in not paying rent. It is App·ellant's posi6
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tion that neither the facts found by the Court nor the
eyidence presented support a finding of constructive
eviction as a matter of law. Appellants further contend
that the l"iourfs findings of fact with regard to the loss
of practice suffered by respondents because of the inconveniences eon1plained of, and the conclusion that respondents vacated as soon as they found new premises do not
conforn1 to the testimony given, nor are they reasonably
implied therefrom.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
I: THE FACTS AS FOUND BY THE LOWER
COURT DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN EVICTION
AS A MATTER OF LAW.
A.

The acts of omission of Appellarnt do not oonstitu.te an eviction.

B.

Respondents ·have not shown Appellant's actions
to have been made with the intent to evict.

C.

The re:sults of the conditions complained of were
not grave, substa.ntial and permanent.

D.

Respondents did not aba.ndon the premises as
a consequence of the conditions complained of,
nor did they leave within a reasonable time after
such conditions occurred. Respondents thus
waived any· defense the conditions might offer. ·

II. THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE LOWER
COURT· ARE NOT JUS.TIFIED BY THE EVIDENCE OF RECORD.
A. There is no evidence presented that such alleged inconveniences were "g~eatly to th~ d~tri
ment of Defendant's profess~onal pract~ce as
7
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found by the Court in Filndings of Fact XI, XII,
XIII.

B. There is no evidence presented to substantiate
a Finding of Fact that Defendants vacat-ed said
premises aas soon as they could find suitable
quarters for their use," as found by the Court.
ARGUMENT
I. THE FACTS AS· FOUND BY THE LOWER
COURT DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN EVICTION
AS A MATTER OF LAW.
A.

The acts of omission of Appella!nt do· not constitute am eviction.

The great majority of the complaints made by respondents involved acts of omission of Appellant or actions by other ·tenants. Thus, respon~ents complained
of inadequate elevator service and heat, improper cleaning of rest rooms, improper lighting, and the obstructions· created by th~ barber shop and beauty salon.
To define such inaction as "eviction" is contrary
to the original concept of eviction, which derived from
trespass,
32 Am. Jur. 231, Landlord and Tenant, Sec.
246,

and has been adequately provided for in our law by an
action for breach of the covenants of rep'air or other similar covenants.
Because eviction is a defense to an action for rent,
some courts have extended the concept to fit the facts
where they feel· rent should not be paid. The legal fal-

8
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lacy of this is admirably stated in Tiffany on Real Property.

··An eviction by the landlord is properly an
a:ffirrnative act on his part, an act of omission,
involving an interruption or interference with
the tenant's possession or enjoyment of the premises. It is, in its nature, a wrongful act which
involves a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoy..:
ment. Unfortunately, the courts have occasionally
lost sight of the true nature of an eviction in this
respect, and because an eviction is a recognized
defense to a claim for rent, there is a tendency
to say that there is an eviction whenever a condi- ·
tion exists on the . premises which the court regards as justifying a failure to pay rent. Some
courts have, for instance, ap~p1ied the term to a
mere failure of the landlord to perform covenants which he may have made, the non-performance of which renders the pr~mises less desirable
for some particular purposes. Thus, breaches·
by a landlord of covenants by him to furnish electric power for uses on the premises, to furnish
heat, to mend leaking pipes, to make the walls
watertight, to restore a building burned by fire,
and to furnish proper elevator service, have each
been referred to as constituting an eviction. Failure
of the landlord to put a stop to the acts of other
tenants which prevent quiet enjoyment of the
premises has also been held to be a constructive
eviction.
"Occasionally the expression has even been
applied to an undesirable physical condition of
the premises, not the result of any act or omission
of the landlord, merely because the tenant has, by
statute, the right to relinquish possession and refuse to pay rent if such condition is not removed.
9
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The mere fact that the tenant is thus given the
right to refuse to pay rerit on account of such "untenantable" condition of the premises does not
impose upon the landlord any obligation to remedy that condition, as appears from the fact which,
it is conceived, is not open to question, that the
tenant has no right of action against the landlord for failure to remove such condition, unless
he .has entered into a covenant to that effect.
This being so, the statement that the existence
of such a condition constitutes an eviction by the
landlord is equivalent to a statement, it would
seem, that the landlord may be guilty of an eviction because he fails to do what he is under no
obligatipn to do. Even when the tenant has entered into a covenant, the failure to perform which
results in an untenantable condition, it is not perceived how either the breach of covenant or the
resulting untenantable condition, or both together,
can properly be referred to as an eviction, whatever may be the effect on the liability for rent.
"Where the failure to perform a covenant
does not render the premises untenantable, but
merely renders their use .for the purposes for
which they were· rented less convenient and more
expensive, there is no eviction; in such case, the
tenant has a remedy by an action for damages for
breach of the covenant."
1

Tiffany Real Property, Third Edition, 1939,
· ·sec. 145, page 238-40.

That property is unfit for the purpose·s of the lease is
not, in itself, grounds for constructive eviction. The law
provides adequate and separate remedies for this. Even
express covenants to repair and maintain are not the
basis of constructive eviction.

'. 10
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·· . . . according to the great weight of authority, a tenant cannot treat the 1nere failure of
the landlord to perfor1n a covenant to keep deInised premises in repair as a constructive eviction, justifying the abandonment of possession
of the premis~s. Generally speaking, the tenant's
remedy is either by an action for damages for
breach of the covenant, by the making of repairs
by himself and the recovery of expenses fron1
the landlord, or by withholding the amount from
the rent . . . "

3:2 Am. Jur. 242, Landlord and Tenant, Sec.
257.
Respondent here has instituted no claim for darnages. The sole issue being that of eviction, the acts of
omission are not relevant. Even those authorities that
extend the concept to .include omissions confine these
to zuillful omissions of the 1andlord.
"Eviction necessarily being the result of an
intended, willful, wrongful act, it must be by a
willful- omission of duty or a commission of a
wrongful act."

Barrett v. Boddie, 158 Ill. 479, at 485.
The.re is no evidence here that the omissions complained
of were of a willful nature. To the contrary, as will be
shown in detail later in this brief, Appellant's acb' with
regard to acts of omission showed an intent to improve
conditions.
The great majority of complaints made by respon~ents were with regard to acts of omission. The Court's
findings of fact which it held justified abandonment by
respondents were confined to deficiency as to heat,
11
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janitor service, elevator service and lighting. These
were, if anything, acts of omission by Appellant. The
Court found the halls to be obstructed at times and the
entrance to be offensive in appearance-these were conditions created, if at all, by actions of another tenant,
and Ap·pellant's only act would be one of omission-i.e.,
failure to prevent a fellow tenant from so acting. The
sole act of commission by Appellant found by the Court
was the locking of the building's front door after 8:00
P.M. and on Sll.ldays and holidays. The court included
such acts of omission in its findings as being material
and relevant to an eviction, citing such acts in its findings of fact, and stating as a conclusion of law,
"That the manner in which Plaintiff operated
and maintained the premises constituted an eviction of the Defendants from said p·remises."
It is mere speculation as to whether the Court would
have come to the same result by considering the one act
of commission alone. Acts of omission are irrelevant
and immaterial to a question of constructive eviction,
and yet they were used to a considerable extent, as shown
by the space devoted to them in the Court's findings of
fact. As such immaterial and irrelevant evidence cannot
be segregated or omitted from any conclusion of law
drawn from such. finding of fact, it is submitted that the
Court erred in basing its conclusions on such findings.

B. Respond.ents have n.ot shown Appellant's act·ions
to have been ma.de with t.he intent to evict.
·The law of ,eviction has shown gradual exp·ansion
of the facts encompassed therein. The old common law

12
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required actual ouster or physical dispossession by the
landlord. This rule has been modified by the concept
of ''constructive eviction." The boundaries of this have
not been, as yet, clearly defined. Of the concept's several
components, the question of intent is the least clear at
all. However, the authorities seem of one mind with
regard to this question; e.g. :
"An untentional act or omission of the landlord, or by those acting under his authority or
with his permission, that pern1anently deprive~
the tenant without his consent of the use and
beneficial enjoyment of the demised ·premises
or any substantial part thereof, in consequence
of which he abandon·s the premises, constitutes
a constructive eviction."
52 C.J.S. 171, § 455.

"As a rule, in order to constitute a constructive eviction, acts or omissions of a landlord in
interference with his tenant's use and enjoyment
must indicate an intention on his part that the
tenant shall ·no longer continue to hold and enjoy
the demised premises."
. 36 Corpus Juris 263, Sec. 989. ·

· "The landlord's interference with a tenant's
use and enjoyment must be substantial and intentional, and their trespass is not sufficient to
constitute a constructive eviction. And the act
or omission complained of must be that of the
landlord and not merely that of a, third person
acting ~ithout his authority or permission."

36.Corpus Juris 262-263, Sec. 988.
"In order that an eviction may take place as
a result of acts on the part of the landlord involv13
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ing merely an interference with the tenant's posses.sion and enjoyment as distinct from an actual
dispossession, it is necessary that they be such as
to indicate an intention on the landlord's part to
deprive the tenant of the possession."
2

Tiffany, L(JJYI)dlord and ·Tenant, Sec. 185,
Sub Sec. B., Page 1259.

". . . as has ·been said in a number of cases,
acts of. the landlord to constitute constructive
eviction must be of a grave and permanent character clearly indicating his intention to deprive
the tenant of beneficial enjoyment of the premises
demised to him, to which the tenant yields, abandoning the possession within a reasonable time~"

32 Am. Jur. 232, Landlord and Tenant, Sec.
246.
"The mere act or a default on the part of the
landlord which renders the premises uninhabitable or untenantable is not sufficient if that act
or default is. not accompanied by an intention on
the ·part of the landlord to affect the enjoyment
of the premises demised."

32 Am. Jur. 235, Landlord and Tenant, Sec.
249.
Such intention is, of course, not exclusively for the
landlord to determine.
Central Busilness College vs. Rutherford, 47
Col. 277, 107 Pac. 279, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.)
637.
Moreover, tenants may be aided by. the usual presumption in cases of intention that the landlord intendB
the natural consequences of his acts.
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I

'

~~The

intent to evict may be indicated by the
arts of the landlord. The intention of the landlord to eYict or deprive the tenant of the enjoynlent of the premises may be presumed from the
character of the act, if the necessary result o{ it
is to depriYe the tenant of the beneficial enjoyInent of the pre1nises."
3:2

A.~nz.

J ur.

~36,

Landlord and Tenant, Sec.

249.
··To constitute a constructive eviction, there
Inust be an intention on the part of the landlord
to evict.
'The intent with which .the act is done
n1ay be an actual intent, accompanying and
characterizing the act, or it may be inferred
fron1 the act itself.'

Skally vs. Shute, 132 Mass. 367.
'Where the issue was whether or not
there was an eviction of a tenant, the intention of the landlord is material.'
8 Encl. Ev. 65.

"The consensus of judicial opinion seems to
be that the act must amount in law to .a willful
trespass, which is but another way of saying that
a;n intent to regain possession must be shown, or
that the landlord has so wantonly or willfully
interfered withthe quiet enjoyment of the tenant,
that an intent to oust will be presumed."

Thompson vs. R. B. Realty Company, 105
Wash. 376, 177 Pac. 769, at 770.
For a clear summary of the history of cases in the
State of Washington on the development of the concept
of intention, see:
15
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Cline vs. Altose, 158 Wash. 119, 290 Pac. 809
at 811-12.

There are no Utah cases directly in point. Barker
vs. Utah Oil Refining Oompan;y, 111 Utah 308, 178 Pac.
2d, 386, is the closest. This case .was an action for rent,
to which Defendants raised the defense of constructive
eviction. Defendant appealed, assigning as error, inter
alia, the Court's ·holdings that the evidence admitted,
together with that tendered (the exclusion of some of
this was assi.gned as further error), did not constitute
an eviction~
There was a dispute as to the amount of land co\Tered
by the lease, which on its face included a dance hall·
together with a service station, while· Plaintiff claimed
it should cover the service station alone. The dance hall
was c<)nverted from a garage by Plaintiff subsequent
to the lease, and Defendants claimed this to be a constructive eviction.
The Trial Court heard no evidence as to the extent
of the .lease's coverage, although ·the findings of fact
included a finding that the lease was confined as Plaintiff
contende~. As the coverage was held a control~ing issue,
this Court ruled this prejudicial error.
With regard to eviction, the Trial Court ruled that
because Plaintiff remained in the operational control of
the premises, Defendant could not prove eviction regardless of Plaintiff's acts. This Court held that the question
of possession was not in issue by the pleadings, and thus,
evidence as to eviction would·not be barred as the Trial
Court had ruled. This Court held that suit for a non-
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payment of rent assumes possession by the Defendant
while the pleading of eviction by Defendant also assumes
possession. It was in this context, and this alone, that
this Court turned to Black's Law Dictionary to show
that acccording to that source, both a definition of actual
eviction and constructive eviction include the element of.
possession. The use of the definition cited for any
other purpose would be pure dicta at best. Barker vs.
Utah Oil Refining Company, supra, gave no sanction to .
the Dictionary's concept of the role. of intent here.
Thus, the statement in Black's Law Dictionary that
''there is constructive eviction when the former (landlord) without intent to oust the latter (tenant) does
some act * * *" must stand or fall on the case law that ·
supports it. Black's Law Dictionary cites R-ealty Go. vs.
Fuller, 33 Misc. Rep. 109, 67 N.Y. Supp. 146; Talbott
vs. English, 156 Ind. 299, 59 N.E. 857; General Industrial
lt Manufacturing Co. vs. American Ga.rment Co., 76 Ind.
App. 629, 128 N.E. 454-455; Santrizos vs. Public Drug
Co., 143 Minn. 222, 173 N.W. 563-4.
Examination of these cases reveals the surp·rising
fact that o~y one of these can be said to fully substantiate the absence of intention, while others are in agreement with our contention herein, or are completely silent
in the matter.
Thus, in Realty Co. vs~ Fuller, supra, an action for
rent with the alleged defense of constructive eviction,
the Court held for the landlord, and in reversing the
lower Court, said :
"To constitute a constructive. eviction, there
17
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must be an intentional and injurious interference
by the landlord, which deprives a tenant of the
beneficial enjoyment of the demised premises, or
materially impairs such beneficial enjoyment* * *.
An eviction cannot be predicated· on acts or. conduct, however wrongful or distressing, unless
committed, encouraged or connived at by the
landlord. He is not responsible for the conduct
of other tenants acting within their rights in their
own apartments * * *.
"But the defense is not without other infirm-ities. Where the right to abando·n pren1ises exists,
the tenant n1ust be removed, with reasonable
promptitude, after the circumstances creating the
eviction arise; and, if he fails to do so, his right
to repudiate the hiring is lost * * * .. He testified
that the annoyance complained of began in N ovember, 1899 and continued from time to time until
the latter part of April, 1900, when he removed
from the building. The retention of the premises
for such a period after the commencement of the
alleged annoyan~e was a confir1nation of the
tenancy, and must be treated as an election by
the tenant to perform the covenants of the lease
and to retain its benefits."

Santrizos vs. Public Drug Co. was an action for rent,
. with the usual defense. The Court, on holding for the
landlord, summarily defined constructive eviction, and
did not mention the element of intent at all.
.

#

Talbott vs. English, supra, was another action for
.

.

rent, in which the landlord prevailed despite a plea
by the tenant of constructive eviction. ·The Court here
uses several quotations and makes reference itself to
intention ·as a requisite to "eviction" (not more par-

18
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ticularly specified) and only after this discussion, does
it 1nake a definition of constructive and actual eviction
\Yhich distinguishes between the. two on the ground,
among other things, of intention. However, any such.
definition would have been more dicta in that case as
'
no constructive eviction was held to exist.
Only General Industrial & Mfg. Co. vs. American
Garnzent Co. appears to support the dictionary's definition, and only then to the extent that it quotes the
Court in Talbott vs. English, sup-ra; and did. allow the
defense of constructive eviction to prevail. There was
no question of intent in the case, and it was not dis.cussed
further.
Even assu,ming General Industrial &_Mfg. Co. vs.
American Garment Co. to be authority on_ the point,
it is clearly against the great weight of authority referred to above, and can only be termed a seldom followed,·
seldom cited minority rule.
The Barker vs. Utah Oil Refining Company case
supra, is not authority for the proposition that Utah
follows this minority rule.
Respondents here made no attempt to show any actual intent to deprive them of beneficial enjoyment on
the part of appellant. At best, they must argue that such
intent was reasonably presumed from the facts.
Yet, rather than p-rogressive deterioration of the
annoyances complained of, one sees that the landlord
has a record of consistent impro~ement. The first winter
the building was used for offices, there were heating
difficulties. By· the second winter,· the landlord had
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installed a completely new thermostatic control system,
which after a time for adjustments, has. worked without
complaint, according to the testimony of the building
manager. This is borne· out by the fact that the building
is still filled. Confusion as to the main entrance was
soon discovered. The :rrta.nagement first had a partition
.
constructed to screen off the barber shop. S.ubsequently,
when this proved not completely satisfactory, they constr-ucted an entirely new entrance from the street directly
to the front of the elevators, and completely cut off the
barber shop by a separate access to the street.
'

The cleaning and janitorial staff was increased (R.
page 105). ·Care . was taken to plan the fourth floor in
the same manner as the third (i.e. without inner rooms),
so as to continue to attract only the higher class tenants
who demanded such planning.
The chain of imp·ro:vements of progressively better
service does not infer an intent to evict-rather, it infers
the converse. It infers the desire of the landlord to
accommodate itself in every way t:Q.at the physical surroundings allow to re.tain its tenants.
It is submitted that the Trial Court erred in not
ruling on the question of intention in its findings of fact
and could not have found· such intention, either actual
or presumed, from the facts found.
C.

The results of the conditions complained of were
not grave, substa;ntial and perma~nent.

The law requires a certain quantum of deprivation
of beneficial enjoYment.
20
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''However, not all wrongful acts of the lessor
"'"hich interfere with the enjoJinent of the premises bY the lessee· amount to a constructive eviction. To constitute a constructive eviction, the
interference by a landlord with the possession of.
his tenant or with the tenant's enjoyment of the
demised premises, n1ust be of·a substantial nature, ,
and so injurious to the tenant as to deprive hirn
of the beneficial enjoJJnent of a part or the whole
of the demised premises * * * . "
32 Am. Jur. 232, Landlord and Tenant, Sec.
246.
HA constructive eviction occurs only where,
through the landlord's acts, the tenant has bee~
substantially deprived of the beneficial enjoyment
of the demised premises. Not. every breach of
covenant . for wrongful ·act on the p·art of the
landlord constitutes an eviction. If a tenant has
not actually been removed from the' premises, he
can establish an · eviction ·only where he shows
that the landlord's acts depTived him substantially
of the consideration of the rental which he agreed
to pay."
Bookman vs. Polachek, 165 N.Y.S. 1023, 1024.

"The foregoing cases plainly do not announce
the rule of any interference by the landlord with
the possession of the tenant, however slight, will
work a constructive eviction, but, on the contrary;
hold that the interference must be of a substantial
nature, and so far ·injurious to his rights to de·prive him of the beneficial use and enjoyment of
the premises."
Cline vs. Alto.se, 158 Wash. 119, 290 Pac. 809,
.
812, 70 A.L.R. 1471.
"That eviction must be, 'not a meTe trespass,
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but something of a grave and permanent character done by the landlord for the intention of
depriving the tenant of the enjoyment of the
demised premises'; and * * * more fully and
accurately defined as 'an act of a permanent
character done by the landlord in order to deprive,
and which had the effect of depriving, the tenant
of the use of the thing demised, or of a part of
it.' "
Upton vs. Townend, 17 C.B. 30, cited in
Meeker vs. Spalsbury, 66 N.J.L. 63, 48
Atl. 1026, 1027.
.
Applying this law to the instant facts,. one sees at
most a series of minor, petty annoyances. Respondents
introduced no evidence that their practice suffered as a
result of these inconveniences.
Much testimony was devoted to the locking of the
building doors after about 8 :30. at night. Despite respondents' testimony that nocturnal labor was "not unusual" (R.
page 43) it would appear that even with such industrious
and able lawyers as respondents unquestionably are, the
great majority of their labors, like that of the entire
legal profession, and the business world in general, is
confined to the twelve hours between 8 :00 A.M. and
8:00 P.M.
Thus, mere impairment of access, not amounting
to exclusion, during such p·eripheral working time could
not be termed a grave, substantial or permanent impairment over the entire time of tenancy.
No stronger statement of respondents' alleged grievances could be expected than .from the list contained in
respondent's letter in which they sought a release from
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their tenancy. (Exhibit 5). Yet, in this letter, no mention
is Iuade \Yhatsoever of the locked doors. One can only
imply that the inconvenience of the locked doors was
not eonsidered significant of mention at. that time and
\vould be hardly termed "grave, substantial or pernlanent." Only upon the advent of litigation did it
assume significance in even respondents' eyes.
This is not a case where the lease, the instrument
which creates the legal relationship which is now in
dispute and through which all problems with regard to
such relationship must initially be viewed, is· silent.
It is not even a case where the lease is ambiguous as to
·Inost elements in dispute.
One should first turn to this instrument. Indeed,
except in the case of omission, ambiguity or wanton and
flagrant. abuse of discretion. granted therein, the law
prevents the parties from turning elsewhere. An in spec-.
tion of that document shows that it effectively deals
with most of the problems in dispute. Thus, the lease
provides:
"The building will be open from 8 :00 A.M.
until 12 :00 P.M~ Tenants desiring the use of office
before or after those hours should apply at the
building office for permission." Rules amd Regulations No. 25.
The only dispute, therefore, appears as to the three
and a half (30) hours from about 8 :30 to midnight
during which the building was locked. Even at this
time, the building was "open" (i.e. accessible to tenants)
by means of the keys furnished them.
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Moreo:ver, the lease provides furthe·r:
"Night· Watch-After 7 :00 P.M. the building
is in charge of the night watchman, and every .
person entering or leaving the building is expected
to be questioned by him as to his business in the
building, if unknown to him." Rules and RegUlations No. 23:
. This is the only provision of the lease in bold faced
type. It is assumed special importance .was attached
thereto. The barring of access of non-tenants, unless
admitted by the tenant or by the watchman, may be
considered a reasonable interpretation of this provis~on.
. With regard to the heat, janitorial, and el~vator
service, it is expressly stated as a term and condition
of the lease :
"Eleventh-The lessors shall be further the ·
sole judge as to the amount of and time when
heat and light shall be supplied to said premises,
and shall be the sole judge of the janitor and
eleva tor service to be supplied."
This clearly cannot be ignored.. Conceding that s-uch
a ·clause would probably not protect a landlord from
flagrant or wanton abuse of the discretion given therein,
it is clear that these services, even as found by the
Court, were only found "inadequate." The Court found
as fact:
VII
"That on frequent occasions, during the cold
months when defendants occupied the premises,
there was inadequate heat and defendants and
their. employees and clients were obliged to wear
heavy winter overclothing."
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VIII
~·That

the janitor service to the premises
supplied by the plaintiff wa.s inadequate."

IX
.
~'That the restroon1 facilities furnished by the
plaintiff for the use of defendants, their employees and clients were inadequate and were not
kept clean, properly ventilated or adequately supplied 'vith soap, towels and toilet paper."
X

"That the janitor service of the halls, stairways and lobby was inadequate."

·XII
"That the plaintiff failed to furnish elevator
service after 8:00 P.M. on week days and on Sundays and holidays, which greatly inconvenienced
the defendants and which· was a detriment to their
professional relationships with clients who were,
on frequent occasions, obliged to come to defendants' offices, located on the third floor of said
building by way of the stairways which were,
on numerous occasions, totally ~unlighted and also
used as a latrine by p·ersons unknown." (Emphasis added).
Moreover, with regard to heat, the lease further .
provided:
"Heat will be provided from the apparatus
for heating the building from 8 :00 A.M. until
9:00 P.M. (Sundays and legal holidays excepted)
whenever such heat shall, in the owners' judgment, be required for the comfortable occupation
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of said pren1ises. Temporary failure to furnish ·
heat shall not, however, be construed as an eviction of the tenant, and shall give tenants no
claim for damages against owners, and shall not
justify tenants in failing to observe and perfor1n
any of the obligations under his tenancy * * *."
R·ules and Regulations No. 14.
Respondents, by their profession, are versed in the
art of contract negotiation. They are learned in the
legal sanction of agreement. It would be unlikely that
they would become parties to this ag.reement not fully
cognizant of its provisions, and respondents do not allege
otherwise. In these matters expressly covered by contract, it is submitted that respondents must not only
show that such conditions resulted in a grave, substantial
and permanent deprivation of their beneficial enjoyment, but they must go farther. They must· show that
there was a wanton and flagrant deprivation of this
enjoyment. Respondents did not approach ·the first
requirement, let alone the second.
It is clear that this· is not the case of the poor lay
tenant be1ng coerced, intin~idated and misled by a corporation and its battery of legal counseL The very
profession of these tenants is the drawing and interpretation of legal instruments. One may wish to preserve the term "constructive eviction," which gives to
the law an equitable flexibility in the field of the landlordtenant, and yet clearly see that to apply it to the case
where the lease provisions are clear with regard to this
matter, and where the lessees are men trained by their
profession in the sanctity of con~ract and the importance
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of the 'Yritten word, is to say that such leas~ provisions
shall never be enforced. If men as p·rominent in the bar
of this State as respondents are not bound· by their
'vritten contract, then may not any tenant subsequently
'vishing escape from his lease justifiably ask, "Why
should I be bound~"
The complaint of obstructions in the stairwell ·by,
and odors from, the main .floor beauty salon presents
the problem of acts of other tenants. The law is clear
in this respect.
~~A landlord is not responsible to one tenant
for the acts of another tenant which are not
expressly or impliedly authorized by him; such
.act cannot be treated as a breach of a covenant
for quiet enjoyment or as a constructive eviction, unless the landlord is shown to be in some
way responsible therefor. But where the act or
conduct of which complaint ·is made has the expressed or implied approval of the landlord, it
may afford a basis for the claim of constructive
eviction."
32 Am. Jur. 247-48, Landlord and Tenant,
S·ec. 263.
The evidence shows no approval of such act . by
appella~ts, but rather drastic steps to force the tenant
to eliminate such practice. Moreover, it was upon the
urging of respondents that the beauty salon was given
its allegedly objectionable location. lri the letter written
by Defendant N eslen. (Exhibit C) he states that there
would be "ample space" for such enterprise behind the
barber shop, and the letter refers to this location as
the "ideal solution." Admittedly, Defendant Neslen was
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merely presenting the arguments for a client. However,
it would take objectivity of a remarkable type for counsel to advocate an issue for a client which, if decided in
his client's favor, would adversely affect counsel himself
in a very personal way. Nothing happened ·upon the
removal of the beauty salon to its place adjacent to the
entrance that could not have been reasonably foreseen. The results, particularly in the light of respondents' advocacy, could not he termed grave, substantial
or permanent impairment.
One fact .stands out concerning all of the conditions
complained of by respondents. These were all conditions
applicable to all of the tenants of the building. Respondents were not the sole tenants nor were they the subject
to discrimination by Appellant .or its agents. Thus, if·
the landlord's actions created a grave, substantial or
permanent impairment of respondent's beneficial enjoyment and e.victed them, it would create the same for all
tenants. Yet, respondents' ahandonment.was not marked
by an exodus of their fellow tenants. In fact, Appellant
has retained the remainder and has added to this the
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company,
Bausch and Lomb, and several other tenants of like
caliber.
"Inadequacy" is not grave, substantial or permanent impairment. It is contended that respondents have,
as a . matter of law, not met the requirements as to
sufficiency of impairment to the extent of constituting
an eViction.

D.

Respondents ·did not abandon the premises as
28
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a consequence of the conditions complained of,
nor did they leave u'i.thin a reasonable time after
such conditions occurred. Respon,dents thus
waived any defense the conditions might offer.
The law in this respect is clearly stated in American
J·urisprudence:
~~Abandonment

of premises by the tenant
within a reasonable time after the wrongful act
of the landlord is essential to enable the .tenant
to claim a constructive eviction ba.sed upon that
'vrongful act, or to defend against liability for
rent on account of such act * * *. Possession
must be given up by the tenant in consequence
of the landlord's acts, and those acts must be
such as to justify the tenant in doing so."
32 Am. Jur., page 236, Landlord and Tenant,
Sec. 250.

Such a waiver is most clearly evident with regard
to the failure to furnish heat.
32 Am. Jur., 243-4, Landlord and Tenant,
Sec. 259. ·

Here respondents abandoned at the end of June
when there was no heating problem. Th~y had paid
their rent up until June 30. Such facts come squarely
within the province of:

Orcutt vs. Ish.ani, 70 Ill. App. 102, cited in
Baptist General Convent.ion vs. Wright,
276 Pac. 777 at 782.
There the Court said:
"A tenant remaining in possession and paying rent not only for months during which a cause
29
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of complaint existed, but for several months afterward, is estopped from setting up such complaint
and justification of an abandonment of the premises * ·* *. Appellants' principal defense was a
breach by Appellee of her agreement and duty
to furnish a requisite amount of steam, heat and
hot water. All the evidence upon that question
related to the winter months and cold weather
from February 15, 1894 to the end of June, 1894,
during all of which time, and three months longer,
the Appellant paid her rent * * *. Appellant
herself testified that she moved out because she
was 'afraid to try it the rest of the winter.' In
other words, she moved out because of something
she feared in the future and not because of what
existed * * * in the past. All complaints that
may have existed in the past were waived by
the Appellant by paying all rent for the months
in which occasion for complaint existed * * *.
A lessee is not at liberty to select out such portion of the term as she is pleased to enjoy and
repudiate the balance."
Waiver is particularly important with regard to
heat.
"It is, however, necessary in order to justify
an abandonment on the ground of the landlord's
failure to furnish heat that such failure must
have continued to the time of the abandoninent:
a tenant cannot justify his abandonment by reason of the landlord's failure to furnish heat if,
at the time, such failure has ceased."

32 Am. Jur. 243:, Landlord and Tenant, Sec.
259.
The other conditions complained of were all of long
duration. They did not Increase in magnitude during
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at least the last v-ear
of tena11cv.
..
. For a court to find
the cause and effect relationship between those conditions and the abandonment, it was necessary for respondent to prove that the abandonment was within
a reasonable time after such offense.
75 .A.L.R. 1114.

The facts clearly do not show this. The barber shop
and the entrance way were there soon after respondents
moved in in 1948. The beauty salon was in its allegedly
objectionable position over a year prior to respondentsi
abandonment. No evidence was submitted by respondents as to a deterioration in janitor or elevator service.
By respondents' testimony, they existed in the· same condition for the entire time of the occup-ancy (R. page 73).
Respondents contend that they could delay abandonment until they found a new location. The authority
for such a contention seems indeed scant, being limited
in the sole annotation, 75 A.L.R. 1114,_ at 1119 to an
English case of 1840; Coure vs. Goodwim, 9 Car. & P.
378, and the casual reference to such a justification for
delay, when combined with mariy other extenuating
facts, as s.omething which the jury might consider, Rome
vs. Johnson, (1931) Mass., 174 N.E. 716.
However, even assuming such a principle to be
established, this did not give respondents license to shop
around and select the best accommodations, or even
more clearly, to merely wait until the best accommodations became available. The very requisites of a constructive eviction are that the beneficial enjoyment has
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become intolerable. The longer the delay in moving,
the less likelihood that the complaints impaired enjoyment sufficiently to constitute eviction.
What are the facts here~ Re~pondents' only specific
testimony on the subject is to the effect that they made
inquiry at the Newhouse Building, and "on occasion''
at the Continental Bank Building (R. page 74). No
inquiry was made at any other building in the City (R.
page 74). In the Sp-ring of 1950, respondents finally
found space in the Continental Bank Building (R. page
74). Only then did they make actual efforts to cancel
their lease with Appellant (R. page 48). ·

It is clear that the cause and effect relationship
present in this case was between the availability of
space in the. Continental Bank Building and subsequent
abandonment, and not between the ·inadequacy of the
Darling Building and subsequent abandonment.
The burden of proof to show the required causal
connection was upon respondents.

Automobile Supply Co. vs. Scene-in-Action
Corporation, 340 Ill. 196, 172 N.E. 35, 69
A.L.R. 1085;
Annotation, 75 A.L.R. 1114 at 1116.
By respondents' own testimony, the availability of
office space was critical in the City (R. page 73). Yet,
despite the admitted difficulty, respondents made only
an inquiry at one other office building and then waited
for space to become· available in the newest office building in the area. An office shortage. ·may extend the time
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of reasonableness, but to so extend the time it is submitted that respondents must show that they took the
extra care to locate new quarters that' the exceptional
situation requi~ed. This was not done here.
Cases of record seldom extend the time for claiming
eviction beyond three ( 3) months. Indeed, the only
. .-\..L.R. annotation on the point says :
"In the great majority of cases abandonment
after a month has been held not to have been
within a reasonable time. There have been several cases where this has been held as a matter
of law."
75 .A.L.R. 1117.

One court has put the matter succinctly.
"(Although) I am satisfied that Defendant
was annoyed by some of Plaintiff's actions * * *
The law is clear that the tenant has only a reasonable time after the alleged eviction within 'vhich
to exercise his right to vacate the premises, and
if he fails to do so, he loses that right. Certainly
the Defendant's occupancy from March until
October 1, during practically all of which time
the alleged cause of abandonment continued,
would operate as a waiver." (Ellis vs. McDermott,.
147 At. 236, 2·38).
The law does not look lightly upon eviction charges.
As Beasley Ch. J., said:
"The legal effect of eviction is so penal, that
the doctrine is not to be favored * * *." (Birckhead vs. C·ummitns, 33 N .J.L. 44 at 56) .
Eviction should not be a means of relief for a tenant
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who, for reasons of prestige or other motives, chooses
to move to more desirable quarters, presenting a catalogue of mere inconveniences extending throughout the
entire two-year tenancy as an excuse to evade his contractual obligation.

II. THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE LOWER
COURT ARE NOT JUS.TIFIED BY THE EVIDENCE OFI RECORD.
A.

There is no evidence presented that such alleged inconveniences were "greatly to the de:triment of Defendant's professional practice" as
. found by the Court in Findings of Fact XI, XII,
XIII.

The Court made.the following Findings of F·act:

XI
'·'That Plaintiff permitted to be established
in the lobby of said building, through which
defendants, their employees and their clients were
obliged to pass a barber shop, a shoe shining
stand and a beauty shop, which gave rise to
offensive sights and .odors greatly to the detriment of defendants' professional practice and
which were disagreeable to the defendants, their
employees and clients."

XII
"That the Plaintiff failed to furnish elevator
service after 8:00 P.M. on week days and on
Sundays and holidays, which greatly inconvenienced the defendants and which was a detriment
to their professional relationships with clients
who were, on frequent occasions, obliged to come
to defendants' offices, located on the third floor
34
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of said building by way of the 8ta.irways which
were, on numerous occasions, totally unlighted
and also used as a latrine by persons unknown.''

XIII
•'That the plaintiff closed the building on
Sundays and holidays and after 8 :00 P.M. on
other days, greatly to the inconvenience of the
defendants and to the detriment of their professional relationship with their clients."
The only evidence submitted as to the result of t~e
inconveniences was to the effect that complaints ·were
received from a few clients as to these conditions.
~Ir.

E.vans testified (R. page 30, 31):

"Q.- Did .you ever receive complaints from your
clients in that respect~
A.

Yes, I did receive complaints from my
clients to waiting out on the street until we
could come down and let then1 in, and I can
remember looking back specifically to two
-occasions, I can remember the individuals
I had to let in that way.

Q.

Along with others you no longer

A.

I can't recall every instance I let a client
in at night, or on Sunday, or a holiday, but
I do recollect the names of two people and
one of them was either a little early or I was
a little late for my appointment and I waited
some time after arriving at my office, and
later received a telephone call from him asking how he could get access to my office and
I had to inform him if he would meet me at.
the door I would come down and let him in."

recall~

35
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

And also (R. page 37):

"Q. Did you ever receive any complaints from
p.ersons with whom you were doing business
to getting in to your office~
A.

Yes, I did receive some complaints particularly from ladies who entered the ·building and
seeing the barber shop would leave, * * *
then. I received telephone calls asking how
they would get into the building and I advised
them that was the entrance they would come
in, but there was confusion on the part of the
people coming in the building."

Mr. N eslen testified (R. page "68, 69) :

"Q. Now, what maneuyers did you have t.o .go
through. to do business with clients and witnesses, or any other person, during the evenings or Sundays or holidays~
A.

Well, on those occasions it was necessary
either to arrange to get the client or the witness at the. door and give him access, or wait
· in our office until we received :a call that he
was downstairs. ·

Q. By the. way, was there any facilities for him
to contact you from this locked door~
A.

No, there were no facilities there, no bell, or
anything of-that nature, and there were occasions when I did have appointments during
the evening hours, or on Sundays · or holidays when I received calls from clients asking me how they could get into ·the building,
and then I have gone down and let them in
and then on several occasions when I was
going to remain after the conference I have
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gone down to let then1 out and have returned
to the office.''
Mr. N eslen further testified ( R. page 70, 71) :
~·Q.

Did you ever receive any co1nments, Mr.
Neslen, from your clients, or any persons
with whom you '\Yere doing business concerning the entrance, or lobby, or foyer to the
building·?

_._\..

Y ~s, I re1nen1ber one particular con1ment
from a client just. after the barber shop
moved in there. This client explained to me
he didn't know whether he was-

A.

The nature of the comment was he could
not tell whether he was entering a barber
shop, .a clothing store, or an office building."

Thus, Mr. Evans revealed only one or two complaints as to the locked door and received some· from
ladies as to the confusing appearance of the entrance.
Mr. Neslen had received phone calls on evenings, Sundays or holidays from clients who asked how they could
get into the building, and recalled a comment from a
client as to the confusing n~ture of the entrance~
This was all the evidence presented in this regard.
It is submitted that the testimony does not show a ·
detriment to respondents' practice. At most, it shows
inconvenience or confusion to a few clients. There is
not even testimony by respondents that they did, in fact,
lose business as a result of complaints about conditions.
The burden is on respondents to .show such a detriment
to their practice. They have not done so, and it is urged
that the Trial Court erred in so finding.
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B.

There is no evidence presented to substantiate
a Fitnding of Fact that Defendants vacated said
premises "as soon as they could find suitable
quarters for their use," as found by the Court.

1

The Court found as fact:
XVIII
"That the defendants moved from and vacated said premises by reason of the acts and
omissions. of the plaintiff as soon as they could
find suitable quarters for their use as attorneys'
offices."
The words "as soon as they could find" state a conclusion-·i.e. that respondents vacated within a reasonable time. The testimony of respondents with regard
to the search for substitute space is as follows :
In cross-examination, Mr. N eslen testified:

"Q.

A.

Mr. Neslen, I believe you said you had made
attempts to find other space, just where did
you inquire~
I inquired at the Newhouse Building.

Q. Yes,A.

And on occasion at the Continental Bank
Building, but . without any encouragement
whatsoever until in the Spring of 1950 our
present space, where we now are, became
available at the Continental Bank.

Q. Did you inquire in any other buildings for
space other than those two~
A.

No; those are the only two· I recall where I
made inquiry;
38

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

l

Q.

There are other office buildings in S.alt Lake
City J?

...\.

That is true.

~[r.

Evans testified (R. page 47, 48):

""Q. Now, I believe you said that you tried to find
son1e space in son1e other building~
...-\..

Yes.

Q.

Among them the Continental Bank

A.

That is right.·

Q.

You are now in the Continental Bank Building?

...i.

That is right.

Q.

When did you first find out space was avail~
able in the Continental Bank Building for
you?

A.

I· think it was probably, I am speaking from
memory, in the month of May, the. early part
of the month of May, 1950.

Building~

Q.

It was about the time you wrote this letter
designated Exhibit 5, wasn't it~
A. It was within, I think, a short time prior to
the time we wrote this letter. I am not sure
· of the exact date. We found this space, it
could have been within two weeks before.
Q. You did not write this letter until after you
. found space available in the Continental Bank
Building~

A.

Q.

That is right.
After you ·wrote this, you had a discussion
with Mr. Dayton, did you not~
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A.
Q.

We had a discussion with Mr. Dayton.
Didn't you ask him if you couldn't get out
of this lease, you had space in the Continental
· Bank and wouldn't they let you out on a
voluntary basis~
A. I think that was discussed, yes.
Q. When you were talking with Mr. Brennan
of the Continental Bank Building, and when
he told you there was space in the building,
didn't you tell him you would have to break
this lease with the Darling people to come
over to take his space~
A. I did tell Mr. Brennan we did have space
in the Darling Building, to take this space
we would have to leave the Darling Building.
Q. Didn't you tell him you would have to break
the lease, Mr. Evans~
A. I don't remember using that word, Mr. Billings."
Mr. Evans further testified (R. page 38):

·"Q.

Now, will you explain to the Court, 1\fr.
Evans, if these conditions were as obnoxious
as you have testified, why you failed to leave
these premises earlier than that date~·
A. We couldn't get in any other quarters.
Q. Did you investigate to find other suitable
quarters~

· A.

We had inquired about other quarters that
would accommodate us. We had prior to
moving particularly contacted the Continental Bank Building about quarters and when
·quarters became available, we would move."
If the Findings o~ · Fact stated that respondents
. vacated "as soon as they did find quarters," it would be
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a correct state1nent. Then the question would still ~
before the Court as to the reasonableness of the time
of abandon1nent. The question could then be raised
whether the limited search for quarters was indeed a
reasonable one, considering the admittedly tight conditions of that date. It is Appellant's contention as shown
above that such abandonment was not within a reasonable time.
Appellants submitted the following substituted finding of fact, which is felt more clearly states the facts
as developed by respondents' testimony:
"That Defendants made an inquiry at the .
Newhouse Building and frequent inquiries at the
Continental Bank Building and when a vacancy
occurred in the. latter building providing them
with. suitable quarters in that building, they
Inoved thereto."
It ·1s submitted that the Court erred in rejecting
this.
SU11MARY AND CONCLUSION
Appellants submit that the Court erred in finding
·any financial detriment to respondents' p,ractice from
the evidence presented, and from finding as a fact. that
respondents removed as soon as possible.
Respondents further submit that the facts as fo~d
by the Court do not satisfy the demanding tests of the
term "constructive eviction." Responden:ts based much ·
of their case on acts of omission of Appellant, which
are legally irrelevant to the question at hand. They
have failed to present necessary evidence as to the intention of Appellant to evict, nor may this be implied from
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the evidence presented. The Court found mere "inadequacies" in the services of Appellant, which finding does
not meet the standard of "grave, substantial a·nd permanent" impairment. Moreover, the inadequacies as to
heat, elevator and janitor service, and the night time
operation of the building were expressly covered by the
lease which is controlling in all cases except where
wanton and flagrant abuse of the discretion allowed
thereon. F-urther, it is contended respondents waived
any eviction by remaining in possession for over two
(2) years despite the continuance of the offensive conditions during this whole period.· R~spondents are not
excused from earlier removal because of the dearth of
other office space, when they have not taken exceptional
steps to meet this exceptional situation, let alone when
they have confined their effective search for new quarters to one building.
Any one of these hurdles alone can prevent respondents from reaching their goal. Together they form a
course which respondents, even when assisted by as able
a steed as "Trial Court Discretion," cannot successfully
complete.
Because of the foregoing, it is submitted that Plaintiffs are entitled to a reversal of the judgment of the
Court below.
Respectfully submitted,
FABIAN, CLENDENIN, MOFFAT
AND MABEY,
PETER W. BILLINGS,
ALBER-T J. COLTON,
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
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